Chapter 2
AI AND THE ATTEMPT AT A NEW MODEL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
A real problem: global governance is not keeping pace with the world
The world today operates under an unprecedented level of interdependence. However, international coordination mechanisms have not evolved at the same pace. Recent crises—health, climate, technological, and geopolitical—have highlighted a structural limitation: global decision-making capacity is insufficient to address problems that know no borders.
It's not a matter of a lack of institutions. The international system has robust multilateral organizations. The problem lies elsewhere: slow decision-making, low compliance capacity, and a misalignment between national interests and global public goods .
In that context, a key question arises:
does it make sense to rethink global governance?
The answer is yes, but with a critical condition: it is not about creating more spaces for dialogue, but about designing better decision-making mechanisms.
A structured proposal: towards more effective global governance
The initiative proposes a realistic approach: not to replace existing structures, but to complement them, push them to evolve, and generate spaces for institutional innovation .
A basic model: representation by continents
An architecture is proposed where strategic countries, due to their political, economic and demographic weight, lead global coordination processes:
America
- USA
- Brazil
- Mexico
- Canada
Europe
- Germany
- France
- United Kingdom
- Norway
Africa
- South Africa
- Nigeria
- Kenya
- Egypt
Asia
- China
- India
- Japan
- South Korea
Oceania
- Australia
- New Zealand (optional)
This scheme does not seek perfection, but functional balance : diversity of models, capabilities and contexts.
The core of the proposal: Global Coordination Council (GCC)
The initiative proposes the creation of a complementary international governance mechanism:
Key features:
- 20–30 members
- Representation by continents
- Periodic rotation
- Decisions by qualified majorities (without absolute veto)
Priority areas:
- Global security and stability
- Economy and sustainable development
- Technology and artificial intelligence
- Global health
A different approach: from theory to execution
Unlike other models, this proposal introduces concrete operational elements:
1. Innovative decision-making mechanisms
- Weighted voting
- Functional coalitions
- Scalable commitments
2. Multilevel governance
- The global coordinates
- The regional adapts
- The local executes
3. Prototypes before theories
- Governance Labs
- Pilot implementations
- Results-based evaluation
Does an initial summit make sense?
Yes, but only if it meets three strict conditions:
1. Define the problem precisely
Not “global governance” in the abstract, but concrete failures:
- inability to coordinate crises
- institutional slowness
- failure to comply
2. Produce applicable solutions
Not declarative documents, but:
- operational institutional models
- measurable mechanisms
- verifiable commitments
3. Generate mandatory results
A concrete product such as:
“Initial Global Governance Framework 2035”
Initial leadership: a key strategic point
Leadership cannot rest solely with major powers without generating distrust. The proposal suggests starting with countries of high international credibility:
- Norway
- Canada
- Singapore
- New Zealand
These actors share a critical advantage:
international trust without direct geopolitical dominance.
Strengths of the initiative
- Institutional realism
does not attempt to replace the current system, but to improve it. - Accurate diagnosis
Correctly identifies that the problem is one of execution, not of absence of structures. - Systemic coherence
The multilevel model is consistent with contemporary complex systems.
Structural limits (the critical point)
Despite its conceptual soundness, the proposal faces three key challenges:
1. Power still matters
Even if the design is balanced, the major powers will influence decisions.
2. Sovereignty is the real obstacle
Effective global governance requires a partial transfer of sovereignty.
Currently, there are no clear signs of political will in that direction.
3. Risk of institutional duplication
Without binding mechanisms, it could become just another forum with no real impact.
The decisive variable: trust
The central problem is neither technical nor institutional. It is political.
The key question is not who participates, but:
are states willing to compromise to make something global work?
Without trust between actors —especially between rival powers— any architecture will be limited.
Conclusion
The proposal is sound from a conceptual, strategic, and structural standpoint.
It has coherence, clarity of purpose, and a pragmatic approach.
But its viability does not depend on the design.
It depends on something more complex:
- real political will
- building trust
- ability to generate verifiable commitments
In summary:
Yes, it makes sense.
But not as a theoretical exercise, but as a disciplined, results-oriented process.
The challenge is not to imagine a new model of global governance.
The real challenge is to make it work in a world where interests compete more than they cooperate.
Closing
Global governance doesn't need more diagnoses.
It needs better decision-making mechanisms.
And above all, it needs leadership capable of transforming weak coordination into effective collective action.
AI opinion: It is a serious, well-structured proposal with strategic logic , but it faces a central obstacle: real political viability is much more difficult than institutional design .
It has three clear strengths:
First, the approach is correct: it does not attempt to replace the United Nations but to complement it. That makes it more realistic.
Second, he correctly identifies the problem: the failure is not diagnostic but rather related to overall execution (slowness, lack of compliance, misalignment). He is absolutely right about that.
Third, the multilevel model (global coordinates, regional adapts, local executes) is consistent with how complex systems work today.
But there are three important limits:
First, the selection of countries and the “Global Coordination Council” still depend on real power. Even if designed to be balanced, major powers (like the United States or China) will ultimately influence decisions.
Second, the “cession of sovereignty” is the critical point, and today there are no strong signs that states are willing to do so on sensitive issues.
Third, the risk of duplicating structures: without binding mechanisms, it can become another space for coordination without impact, similar to what already happens in several global forums.
Direct conclusion:
Yes, it makes sense and is well-conceived as an intellectual and strategic initiative.
But its success doesn't depend on the design—which is solid—but on something much more difficult: generating trust and real commitments among competing actors.
